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ABUSE OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: THE “HISTORIC
KINSHIP”
DAVID W. BARNES1
ABSTRACT
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court
applied a doctrine formulated for patent law to an issue arising in copyright
law. The Court supplied a rationale for doing so by identifying a “historic
kinship” between patent and copyright law based on fundamental goals of
intellectual property law. The Court considered how the rationale applied in
the particular factual context involved. The Court cautioned that the
propriety of extending a doctrine developed in one intellectual property
regime to another depends on the particular legal issue involved.
Despite the importance of ensuring that new rules are consistent with
the underlying rationale for intellectual property law and the Supreme
Court’s cautionary language, lower courts regularly quote the “historic
kinship” as a justification for applying rules from one regime to another.
This article surveys all of the cases referring to Sony’s “historic kinship”
and finds that most lower courts abuse the precedent by failing to consider
the rationale and heed the caution. The risk created by this misapplication
of Supreme Court precedent is that new intellectual property rules may be
inconsistent with the underlying goals or inconsistent with other doctrine.

1. Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the Supreme Court transformed a statutory provision of patent
law to a common law rule of copyright and recognized a “historic kinship”
between the two regimes.2 The new rule limited copyright owners’ ability to
impose vicarious liability on copyright infringers. Two critical features of
the Court’s opinion in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios are
particularly relevant to lower courts using this ruling as precedent. First, the
“historic kinship” refers to the shared rationale for limiting inventors’ and
authors’ exclusive rights.3 Second, the Court encouraged lower courts to
“exercise the caution which we have expressed in the past in applying
doctrine formulated in one area to the other.”4 While scholars question
whether there is indeed any kinship,5 lower courts leap at the opportunity to
2. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
3. Id. at 439, n.19; see Part II, infra (discussing this rationale).
4. Id. at 439, n.19 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–18 (1954) and Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), both of which are discussed in Part III).
5. See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright
Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL.PROP. L. REV. 307, 356 (2005) (stating “at the end of the eighteenth century,
there was indeed a historic kinship between patent law and copyright law, as the Supreme Court has
indicated, but today that kinship has largely, if not entirely, disappeared due to the divergent interpretation
of the patent power and the copyright power by both Congress and the courts in the intervening 200 years.
That divergence has occurred not so much because of changes in the interpretation of the patent poweralthough there have indeed been some – but rather as a result of the massive expansion that has been
afforded to the interpretation of the copyright power).
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apply doctrine formulated in one area to another, often without analysis or
caution.
The analysis in this article is based on a simple proposition: it is
improper to take a statement of the Supreme Court (or other authority) out
of context and cite it without support or justification. The support may be in
the form of precedent from another authority. The justification may come
from considering the Supreme Court’s rationale and heeding the Supreme
Court’s caution. During the three-plus decades following Sony, the vast
majority of lower courts referring to the “historic kinship” have failed to
mention the rationale and have failed to heed the caution. Thirty-seven
opinions6 have cited the Supreme Court’s recognition of the “historic
kinship,” mostly in copyright cases involving issues far removed from
Sony’s vicarious liability context. The vast majority of these opinions fail to
refer to the underlying rationale for extrapolating from one regime to the
other, and if they do, fail to consider whether it applies to the issue at hand.
The vast majority of these thirty-seven opinions also fail to heed the
Supreme Court’s caution that there are significant differences between the
regimes. Only a few mention the caution and fewer actually consider whether
there are doctrinal similarities that justify extending the rules in one regime
to another. Since 1984, when Sony was decided, only three of the thirtyseven cases cited the “historic kinship” in the same legal context, vicarious
liability, as Sony.7 Since 1984, no court citing the “historic kinship” has both
considered the rationale and heeded the caution when extending a rule in a
new legal context. The result of three-plus decades of lower courts blindly
relying on the “historic kinship” is a growing body of law creating parallels
between patent and copyright law without detailed analysis or logical
support. Taking the Supreme Court’s proposition that patent and copyright
should be treated similarly out of context without analysis is an abuse of the
Supreme Court precedent.
6. A Westlaw search in the Federal Cases database for “historic kinship” yields 39 cases. Sony
itself and another is a duplicate report, see Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of
Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. Florida Priory of Knights Hospitallers of Sovereign Order of Saint
John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, Ecumenical Order, 702 F.3d 1279, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (vacating
and superseding an earlier opinion in the same case reported at 694 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2012) without
any effect on the content of the relevant analysis). That leaves thirty-seven cases that are the subject of
this article.
7. Of the three cases, only Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., addressed the same
issue as considered in Sony. See Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (discussing vicarious liability through knowingly assisting a copyright infringer). A second opinion
addressed a closely analogous issue, Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (discussing vicarious liability through inducing or encouraging another to infringe). The third that
applied a portion of Sony’s analysis, Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 2005 WL 936882 (N.D.
Ill. 2005) (considering whether there were substantial non-infringing uses). See Part III, infra, discussing
these cases.
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Part II of this article explains the Supreme Court’s rationale so that one
can properly evaluate lower courts’ use of Sony as precedent. The Supreme
Court’s opinion in Sony facilitated the wholesale transfer of patent law rules
into copyright law where copyright law had no applicable law. The Supreme
Court justified its extension of patent law’s vicarious liability rule by citing
a particular rationale for limiting the exclusive rights of intellectual property
rights owners. If Sony is to be precedent for extension of other rules, the same
rationale must apply. Part II A and B explain the rationale and describe the
balancing process inherent in formulating rules for patent and copyright law.
Part II C illustrates what the Court meant when it admonished lower courts
to use caution when treating copyright and patent law as identical. Part II
establishes a framework for reviewing the thirty-seven cases quoting Sony’s
“historic kinship.”
Part III analyzes the use of the Sony as precedent in two kinds of cases.
The first are cases where the lower court is considering the same legal issue
as that considered in Sony. A lower court applying a vicarious liability
doctrine formulated in patent law to copyright law need not reanalyze the
rationale and caution in Sony because the Supreme Court has already done
so. The second are cases where a lower court relies on an authoritative higher
court’s complete analysis when applying Sony to a new legal issue. It is not
necessary for every court using a legal rule first adopted in one area to
resolve a dispute in another area. If a lower court follows the precedent of a
higher authoritative court, the lower court need not reinvent the wheel by
independently justifying the rule it follows. Opinions falling into either of
these two categories cannot properly be considered to have abused the
Supreme Court precedent, even if they do not contain complete analyses of
their own.
Part IV demonstrates the widespread failure of courts to consider the
rationale for and caution underlying similar treatment of patent and
copyright cases. The legal issues considered in these cases have no obvious
connection to the issue considered in Sony and no precedential support, yet
fail to consider Sony’s rationale or heed Sony’s caution. Many such opinions
include only a bare citation to Sony without further elaboration. In the
collection of all opinions citing the “historic kinship,” there is a dramatic
lack of analysis of whether it makes sense to apply a rule formulated in one
area to another.
Part V summarizes the history of abuse of Supreme Court precedent
apparent in the vast majority of the cases citing the “historic kinship.” It
concludes that, judged by the standard of whether they used the Sony
precedent correctly, lower courts have been seriously derelict. Failing to
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consider whether transferring a rule from one area to another makes sense in
light of the goals and doctrinal substance of copyright and patent law may
lead to a coherent body of law, but only by chance. Thus, this article
identifies a threat to the logical development of intellectual property law.8

8. This article does not consider the historical accuracy of the claim that patent and copyright law
share an historic kinship. Nor does it consider whether adopting another regime’s rule in a particular
substantive or procedural context is desirable from a policy or doctrinal perspective. For a thoughtful
examination of the relationship between patent and copyright law, see Peter S. Mennell and David
Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941 (2007), which concludes that vicarious liability rules in
patent and copyright have their historical roots in tort law, but come from different tort principles. The
authors conclude that the “historic kinship” premise of Sony cannot withstand scrutiny because the
vicarious liability rules have different torts roots. Id. at 941. From Sony’s footnote 19, however, it appears
that the Supreme Court was not referring to the roots of secondary liability specifically, but rather the
underlying goal of limiting intellectual property owners’ rights generally. The Supreme Court documents
these historical roots, as discussed in Part II, infra. Whether examining the historical roots of secondary
liability from a tort law perspective would have led to a superior result in the Sony context, as Mennell
and Nimmer suggest, is beyond the scope of this article.
Curiously, secondary liability in trademark law also has its roots in tort principles. The Supreme
Court, however, emphatically denied in Sony that there was any historic kinship between patent and
copyright on one hand and trademark law on the other:
We have consistently rejected the proposition that a similar kinship exists between copyright law and trademark
law, and in the process of doing so have recognized the basic similarities between copyrights and patents. The
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); see also, United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 141
(1918) (trademark right “has little or no analogy” to copyright or patent); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254
(1877); Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 322, 20 L. Ed. 581 (1871). Given the fundamental differences between
copyright law and trademark law, in this copyright case we do not look to the standard for contributory infringement
set forth in Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 854–855 (1982), which was crafted for
application in trademark cases. There we observed that a manufacturer or distributor could be held liable to the
owner of a trademark if it intentionally induced a merchant down the chain of distribution to pass off its product as
that of the trademark owner’s or if it continued to supply a product which could readily be passed off to a particular
merchant whom it knew was mislabeling the product with the trademark owner’s mark. If Inwood’s narrow
standard for contributory trademark infringement governed here, respondents’ claim of contributory infringement
would merit little discussion. Sony certainly does not “intentionally induce[ ]” its customers to make infringing
uses of respondents’ copyrights, nor does it supply its products to identified individuals known by it to be engaging
in continuing infringement of respondents’ copyrights.

Id. at 855. This quotation confirms the observation in the previous paragraph that the Supreme Court was
referring to the underlying rights-limiting rationale for patent and copyright law rather than the historic
roots of secondary liability rules because trademark law shares those torts roots with patent and copyright
law.
Another possible basis for the “historic kinship” lies in the shared Constitutional origin of
copyright and patent law in the so-called “Intellectual Property Clause,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Edward C. Walterscheid, in Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright Power, 9 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307 (2005), observed:
This certainly seemed to suggest that there is nothing fundamentally different between the creative efforts of
authors and inventors, so that “the exclusive Right” afforded to each of them ought to be treated similarly. As we
shall now see, however, the interpretation afforded the patent and copyright power by both the Congress and the
courts has diverged widely, particularly in the modern era.

This quotation supports the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts should use caution in transferring
the rules of one regime into another.
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II. THE PRECEDENTIAL ROOTS OF THE “HISTORIC KINSHIP”
Nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is alleged
to have said that the most common stupidity consists in forgetting what one
is trying to do.9 In Sony, the Supreme Court tried to decide whether it was
appropriate to apply patent doctrine to copyright law. The copyright owners
offered a number of theories on which Sony could be held vicariously liable
but none applied to the facts of the case. The Court then considered whether
a statutory rule from patent law should be copied from patent law and newly
imprinted on copyright law. This Part describes the process by which the
Court developed the new copyright rule, its rationale for doing so, and how
it warned lower courts to be cautious when translating rules from one
substantive law area to another. This article begins with enough of a
discussion of the facts of Sony that the context for this translation is clear.
The goal of this Part II is to provide a framework for appreciating what
constitutes a proper use of Supreme Court precedent by lower courts. The
analysis shows that lower courts forget what they are trying to do – adopt
new rules that are based on a logical and prudent analysis.
A. The Supreme Court’s Rationale in Sony
To understand the Court’s rationale in Sony, one must understand the
context in which the claims in Sony arose. This section discusses the facts of
the case, the relevant legal rules, and why the Court went beyond the
boundaries of copyright law and imported a new rule from patent law. The
“why” rests on the Court’s identification of a “historic kinship” between
patent and copyright law that justified the new rule because of the nature of
the facts and the legal issue presented.
1. The Facts and Legal Issue
In Sony, the Court considered a claim by the owners of some
copyrighted television shows that the manufacturer of video tape recorders
(“VTRs”) should be vicariously liable for unauthorized copying of those
shows by consumers using the VTRs. Under copyright law, vicarious
liability could be imposed only if Sony, the manufacturer, was “in a position
to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use
without permission from the copyright owner.”10 Sony’s only contact with
consumers was selling the VTRs. It had no control over use and authorized
9. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 52 (1936).
10. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984).
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no particular uses.11 There was no precedent in copyright law for imposing
vicarious liability when a manufacturer sells equipment with “constructive
knowledge of the fact that their customers may use that equipment to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.”12
It would be possible to impose vicarious liability in such a case under
patent law. In patent law, a seller may under some circumstances be held
indirectly or vicariously liable when a purchaser uses the sold article to
infringe a patent.13 One exception to this indirect liability in patent law is that
the manufacturer is not liable if the article is “a staple article or commodity
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”14 If the exception
to this patent rule could be applied in the copyright context, Sony would be
excused from vicariously liability for consumers’ making authorized copies
even if Sony should have known customers were also using the equipment
to make unauthorized copies.15 The Court justified the application of the
substantial noninfringing use rule by finding that similar policy issues arose
in patent and copyright law and that it was “appropriate to refer [to patent
law] because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.”16
2. The Basis for Finding a “Historic Kinship” between Patent and
Copyright Law
The Court did not impress this patent rule on copyright law without
considering the propriety of doing so. It based the “historic kinship” on three
cases, all of which analogize copyright to patent and limit the rights of
copyright owners. The oldest of these cases is Wheaton v. Peters.17 Wheaton
limited authors’ rights after considered the underlying similarity of the works
of authors and inventors in terms of the mental engagement necessary to
produce their works and their entitlement of the fruits of their labors.18 Fox

11. Id. at 437–38.
12. Id. at 439.
13. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2010) (stating “whoever sells a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer).”
14. Id.
15. Sony., 464 U.S. at 456 (stating “the Betamax is, therefore, capable
of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony’s sale of such equipment to the general public does not constitute
contributory infringement of respondent’s copyrights.”)
16. Id. at 439.
17. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) (involving a claim by Wheaton (and related other)
to copyrights on their published reports of Supreme Court opinions. Because Wheaton failed to follow
the legal formalities for obtaining the copyrights, he could not prevent others from publishing the reports).
18. Wheaton, 33 U.S. 591 at 657–58:
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Film Corp. v. Doyal19 also illustrates the long-recognized limit on authors’
exclusive entitlements. Fox Film is a tax case where the Court considered
whether royalties from copyrights are taxable. The Court stated that
copyright royalties and patent royalties are both taxable because “[a]
copyright, like a patent, is ‘at once the equivalent given by the public for
benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and
the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.’”20 Note the
identification of two interests: 1) obtaining benefits for the public and 2)
providing rewards for creators to further efforts. The two interests are
essential to Sony’s rationale. As between these two interests, “the primary
object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.”21
The third case cited in Sony similarly emphasizes the limits on
intellectual property rights for the public benefit. United States v. Paramount
Pictures22 is an antitrust case in which the Court considered whether it was
legal for producers and distributors of movies to require the performance of
one copyrighted movie that the licensee acquire a license for other movies
as a condition of licensing.23 The producers and distributors used a technique
of utilizing the popularity of one movie (to which it had exclusive rights
under copyright law) to obtain more theatrical showings of its less popular
movie to enlarge their monopoly. While the copyright monopoly is necessary
to provide a reward to the creator of the copyrighted work, “the copyright
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration”24 to encouraging access to creative works. Each of these cases
illustrate the rationale for limiting authors’ and inventors’ rights.
When developing rules for patent and copyright, the Supreme Court in
Sony, quoting legislative history, affirmed that two questions are relevant:
In what respect does the right of an author differ from that of an individual who has invented a most
useful and valuable machine? In the production of this, his mind has been as intensely engaged, as long; and,
perhaps, as usefully to the public, as any distinguished author in the composition of his book.
The result of their labours may be equally beneficial to society, and in their respective spheres they
may be alike distinguished for mental vigour. . . .
That every man is entitled to the fruits of his own labour must be admitted; but he can enjoy them
only, except by statutory provision, under the rules of property, which regulate society, and which define the rights
of things in general.

19. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932).
20. Id. at 127–28, quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1858) (stating “that the limited
and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage;
the benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting
and securing that monopoly.”).
21. Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 127.
22. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
23. Id. at 157.
24. Id. at 158.
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First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer [by rewarding
creators] and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly
granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under
the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs
the evils of the temporary monopoly.”25

The Supreme Court has described the Intellectual Property Clause in
Article I, § 8, Cl. 8 of the United States Constitution as “reflect[ing] a balance
between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies
which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress
of Science and useful Arts.’”26 The intellectual property statutes reflect
Congress’ attempts to address the “difficult balance between the interests of
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of the writings and
discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow
of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand . . . .”27 But benefit
to the public through free access is given greater weight than inventors’ and
authors’ interest in control and reward through the exclusive right to exploit
the creation.
In 2016, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this underlying objective of
copyright law in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. In that case, Justice
Kagan said that the goal of copyright law is “enriching the general public
through access to creative works” by “striking a balance between two
subsidiary aims: encouraging and rewarding authors’ creations while also
enabling others to build on that work.”28 Justice Kagan approved a copyright
owner’s argument for considering the “objective reasonableness” of a party’s
litigating position when awarding attorney’s fees because it “enhance[es] the
probability that both creators and users (i.e., potential plaintiffs and
defendants) will enjoy the substantive rights the statute provides.”29 Justice
Kagan’s analysis illustrates how striking the balance sometimes favors
intellectual property rights holders.

25. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984) (referring
to what Congress should consider when developing patent and copyright rules and quoting H.R. REP. No.
60-2222, at 7 (1909)). See also Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 813 n.49 (2009) (stating “of course, the need to balance incentives and access
is nothing new and has been a long-standing feature of intellectual property scholarship in general and
the economic analysis of intellectual property in particular.”).
26. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
27. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
28. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1986 (2016).
29. Id. at 1987.
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B. Sony’s Balancing Process
Sony provides an illustrative example of how lower courts should apply
the general rationale underlying the structure of intellectual property law to
particular legal questions. The video tape recorders (VTRs) manufactured by
the alleged copyright infringers could be used by consumers to record a
television program at one time and save it for viewing at another time.30 This
“time shifting” was the primary consumer use for the machine31 and one that
fell within copyright law’s “fair use” provisions.32 In addition, some
copyright owners other than the complainants had no objection to consumers
copying for home use—particularly suppliers of sports, religious, and
educational programming.33 Permissible copying of these works was also
noninfringing. There was no precedent in copyright law for imposing
vicarious liability on a person who should have known that consumers would
make unauthorized copies of some copyrighted works, but patent law
provided a useful analogy in its contributory infringement rule of § 271(c),
discussed in Part II.A.1, above.
Why is it appropriate here to analogize patent and copyright law in this
case? Contributory infringement in patent law is limited to “the knowing sale
of a component especially made for use in connection with a particular
patent.”34 Patent law does not object to sale of an article that is also useful in
connection with other patents35 or for other lawful uses.36 The contributory
infringement rule allows a patentee to control the distribution of articles that
are “unsuited for any commercial non-infringing use.”37 The exception for
articles with substantial non-infringing uses (the “staple article of
commerce” exception) limits that control, thereby achieving the proper
balance of incentives through exclusive rights and public access:
[I]n both areas the contributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the
recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may require the courts to look
beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the products or activities
that make such duplication possible. The staple article of commerce doctrine
30. Sony, 464 U.S. at 423.
31. Id. at 423. The copyright owners offered no evidence of decreased television viewing by
Betamax owners. Id. at 424.
32. Id. at 454–55.
33. Id. at 424.
34. Id. at 440.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 441–42 (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), stating “[A] sale of an
article which though adapted to an infringing use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough
to make the seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels of commerce”), overruled
on other grounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917).
37. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440 (quoting Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hoss Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198
(1980).
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must strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for
effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly, and the
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.
Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable
of substantial noninfringing uses.38

The Court recognized “substantial differences”39 between patent and
copyright law, but stated that in both areas, courts must look beyond actual
duplication of a patented device or copyrighted work and strike this
balance.40
Meaningful copyright protection, like patent protection, requires that
owners of intellectual property be able to control articles provided by indirect
infringers that can only be used by direct infringers to violate the owner’s
rights. But allowing a copyright or patent owner to block sale of a commodity
with substantial non-infringing uses would inappropriately “block the
wheels of commerce.”41 Free access to commodities with noninfringing use
in both regimes trumps the exclusive right to control distribution. Thus, the
legal question became whether the VTRs have substantial noninfringing
uses. The Court found that they did because both copying of TV shows
broadcast by those who did not object to copying and time shifting were
lawful uses.42
Implicit in this recitation is the assertion that a lower court properly
citing the “historic kinship” as authority for adopting a rule other than the
vicarious liability rule of Sony from one regime to another should engage in
a similar exercise to see whether doing so would further the underlying
rationale.43 A review of lower court opinions citing the “historic kinship”
shows that they routinely fail to do so. Only six of the thirty-seven cases
referring to the “historic kinship” even mentioned the rationale and only four
considered whether extending a rule from one regime to another was
consistent with the goals of intellectual property law.44 The implication of
this failure is that rules from one regime may be arbitrarily or inappropriately
translated to another and potentially work against the stated goals of patent
and copyright law.

38. Id. at 442.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912).
42. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
43. A lower court that applied the new Sony contributory liability rule would, of course, not need to
do so because it can rely on Sony for authority. See Part III, infra, discussing cases.
44. See Table I, infra.
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C. Using Caution When Translating Rules from One Regime to Another
Sony also provides illustrative examples of why courts must use caution
when translating rules from one regime to another. The Court cites BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus45 and Mazer v. Stein,46 two widely cited copyright cases
that compare patent and copyright law. The distinction in both cases arises
from the nature of the fundamental rights awarded to authors and inventors.
A copyright gives authors an exclusive right to copy, distribute, and sell
copies of a work.47 Patent law, by contrast, gives creators an exclusive right
to prevent others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell useful
articles.48 In Bobbs-Merrill, the Court quoted Judge Lurton, who stated:
There are such wide differences between the right of multiplying and vending
copies of a production protected by the copyright statute and the rights secured
to an inventor under the patent statutes, that the cases which relate to the one
subject are not altogether controlling as to the other.49

These differences require different legal rules in the two regimes.
The fundamental differences between patent and copyright law was also
important in Mazer because the issue was whether an artistic creation
(specifically, a sculpture) that was incorporated into a useful manufactured
article (specifically, as the base of a table lamp) could be copyrighted.50 The
Supreme Court dismissed the potential overlap between copyright and patent
law in Mazer by recognizing that a copyright gives no exclusive right to the
underlying useful idea. In Mazer, the useful idea was supporting a table lamp
by a sculptural figure. Copyright only grants the exclusive right to prevent
others from copying the particular artistic creation, here, the appearance of
the particular statuettes.51 Whether the useful idea is protectable is the
domain of patent law.52 Thus, the Court in Mazer held that there was nothing

45. See generally Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 339–51 (1908).
46. See generally Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 201–221 (1954).
47. Additional rights subsequently bestowed on authors by copyright law appears in 17 U.S.C. §
106 of the Copyright Act.
48. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a): “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”
49. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 28 (6th Cir. 1907).
50. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202.
51. Id. at 217 (stating “Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed;
protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.)”
52. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (stating “Inventions patentable: Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”)
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to bar copyright protection for artistic works whose intended use was in
industrial applications.53
The Court’s cautionary language focuses lower courts’ attention on the
differing approaches of patent and copyright law to different legal issues and
requires lower courts to focus on the particular legal issue they are
considering. The fundamental nature of copyrightable as opposed to
patentable works was the focus of the Court’s concern in Mazer because the
legal issue was whether the artistic works in question were the type of subject
matter that could be protected. The Court applied different rules in copyright
and patent law because each covers different subject matter. Each has a
distinct statutory provision providing for different coverage.54 It would,
therefore, be inappropriate to import into copyright law a subject matter rule
from patent law.
To exercise caution about extending the rule from one regime into
another, a court should focus on differences between patent and copyright
law as they relate to the specific issue at hand. The court in Sony did so by
comparing the regimes’ vicarious liability rules in light of the underlying
rationale for protection of inventions and authored works.55 Sony also cited
other cases in which patent and copyright law were compared – each time
focusing on the specific legal issues and facts presented in those cases. In
Fox Film,56 the Court said that, when considering the taxation of copyright
royalties, “in this aspect royalties from copyrights stand in the same position
as royalties from the use of patent rights.”57 In Paramount,58 the Court said
that, when consider the anticompetitive effects of licenses granted by
copyright and patent owners, “a copyright may no more be used than
53. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (stating “We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its
registration. We do not read such a limitation into the copyright law.)”
54. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102 (describing the subject matter of copyright) with 35 U.S.C. § 101
(describing the subject matter of patent law).
55. The Court in Mazer refers to the rationale after distinguishing patentable and copyrightable
subject matter:
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.” United States
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). However, it is “intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable
rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; ‘to afford greater encouragement to the
production of literary (or artistic) works of lasting benefit to the world.’” Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306
U.S. 30, 36 (1939).
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.

Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
56. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
57. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
58. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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a patent to deter competition between rivals in the exploitation of their
licenses.” Both cases appropriately limit their conclusions about the
similarities or differences to the particular question at hand—taxation and
competition policy, respectively.
The preceding discussion of how to apply the cautionary language of
Sony indicates that a lower court properly citing the “historic kinship” as
authority for adopting a rule other than the vicarious liability rule of Sony
from one regime to another should engage in a similar exercise to see
whether the two regimes are fundamental similar with respect to the issue in
question. A review of lower court opinions citing the “historic kinship”
shows that they routinely fail to use caution. Only seven of the thirty-seven
cases referring to the “historic kinship” considered whether patent and
copyright law were doctrinally similarly enough to justify applying a rule
formulated for one area in another.59 The vast bulk of the cases mechanically
quoted Sony’s cautionary language without further analysis. Of the thirtyseven cases quoting the “historic kinship” language of Sony, only two
referred to both the rationale and the caution and fully analyzed both whether
the rationale applied and whether it was doctrinally appropriate to treat the
two areas similarly.60 The implication of this failure is that rules from one
regime may be again be arbitrarily or inappropriately translated to another.
III. EXCUSABLE LACK OF ANALYSIS
The preceding review of lower courts’ use of Supreme Court precedent
slightly overstates the abysmal record of abuse. Dynacore Holdings Corp. v.
U.S. Philips Corp.61 was the only court that cited both Sony’s rationale and
caution when addressing the vicarious liability in copyright law issue
presented in Sony. It would be redundant and therefore unnecessary for
courts facing this issue to repeat Sony’s analysis when they can justifiably
rely on Sony’s precedent because of the identical issue involved. For that
reason, the dissenting judge in Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp.62
and the court in Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc.63 might also be
excused from referring to either the rationale or the caution. Promega
considered vicarious liability of a slightly different sort, inducing or
encouraging another to infringe a copyright rather than knowingly assisting
59. See infra Table I.
60. See infra Table I.
61. Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing the
rationale for limiting vicarious liability in patent and copyright law).
62. Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Prost, C.J.,
dissenting).
63. Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 2005 WL 936882, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2005).
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another’s infringement as in Sony. Monotype Imaging did not refer to the
“historic kinship” or to Sony in the context of vicarious liability but rather
when evaluating whether comparing the number of infringing and noninfringing uses in which the defendant had engaged.64 Since this factual
question is similar to the substantial non-infringing use question involved in
Sony,65 the Monotype court’s quick reference to the “historic kinship” is also
probably acceptable. Thus, these three cases should be removed from the list
of thirty-seven courts abusing Supreme Court precedent.
Fairness also requires looking for additional examples of lower courts
that followed higher courts’ precedent that had properly followed Sony’s
guidance when apply a rule formulated in one regime to another. The greater
the number of such instances, the less egregious is the history of lower court
abuse of Supreme Court precedent. The most notable opinion citing the
“historic kinship” and setting precedent for lower courts involving a legal
issue other than vicarious copyright liability is Harris v. Emus Records
Corp.,66 which involved transferability of copyright licenses. Harris both
applied the rationale and considered the Supreme Court’s caution before
applying a patent law rule to copyright. Perhaps this not surprising because
Harris was decided the same year as Sony and had the fresh Sony opinion in
front of it.67 Six other subsequent opinions referred to the “historic kinship”
also involved this licensing question68 and two others arguably involved
related licensing issues.69 Because Harris applied the rationale to the
licensing context and followed the Supreme Court caution and four of these
opinions properly cited Harris as authority, their references to the “historic
kinship” cannot be considered abuse. The other two licensing cases, Cincom
Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp.,70 can perhaps be excused for not engaging in
a detailed analysis given that the legal issue (transferability of copyright
licenses) had been well-settled by Harris (albeit in a different circuit)
64. Id.
65. See text accompanying notes 14 to 17, describing the factual context.
66. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984).
67. The second most faithful consideration of the rationale and caution appears in an antitrust case,
where a balancing of procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive harms associated with various practices
(here, licensing conditions) are to be expected. See In re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig., 989
F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D. Kan. 1997). See infra Table I.
68. SQL Solutions Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 1991 WL 626458, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991); In re
Patient Educ. Media, 210 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774,
778 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Buildnet, Inc., 2002 WL 31103235, at *5 n.3 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sep. 20, 2002);
Cincom Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 2007 WL 128999, at *2 n.5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2007); Cincom
Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 435 n.2 (6th Cir. 2009); see infra Table I.
69. See Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 877 F. Supp. 496, 500 (N.D. Cal. 1995) rev’d 83
F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996); Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2007); see infra Table I.
70. See Cincom Systems, Inc. WL 128999, at *2 n.5; Cincom Systems, Inc., 581 F.3d at 435 n.2 in
Table I, infra.
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twenty-five years earlier. Twin Books involved licensee estoppel71 and Davis
involved the prospective nature of licenses72 rather than transferability but
cited Harris for the proposition that patent and copyright licensees should be
treated similarly.73 These eight cases probably should not be considered
abusive. On the other hand, at least one case not involving licensing
inappropriately cites Harris as authority for transferring a rule from one area
to another without further analysis.74
Among all the other cases citing the “historic kinship,” there are a few
in which several courts addressed the same legal issues. If later opinions
properly relied on the thorough prior analysis of a higher authority, like
Harris, these later opinions are not abusive. In the three preemption cases,75
and three right-to-a-jury-trial cases,76 however, there is no analysis of the
rationale or caution appearing in Sony, even though the legal issues are
entirely different from the Sony’s vicarious liability question, nor did the
later courts cite the earlier as supporting precedent. These cases stand in the
same “abusive” category as the overwhelming majority of the thirty-seven
cases that blindly cite Sony without considering whether the rationale for
intellectual property protection applies or whether patent and copyright are
similar enough to justify transferring a rule from one area to another.
This review suggests that twelve of the thirty-seven cases should not be
considered abusive. The three cases citing the “historic kinship” in the same
context of patent and copyright vicarious liability are not abusing the
precedent by failing to reanalyze the rationale or obey the caution. The
principle also applies to courts extending the logic of the historic kinship to
new legal issues. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Harris v. Emus Records
Corp.77 and the cases citing it in the licensing context illustrate such an
extension. Thus, there are 25 out of the thirty-seven cases that failed properly
to consider the rationale and caution.

71. Twin Books, 877 F. Supp. at 500.
72. Davis, 505 F.3d at 104.
73. See Twin Books, 877 F. Supp. at 500; Davis, 505 F.3d at 104.
74. See Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. Clinton, 766 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (execution of
copyright to satisfy a judgment); infra Table I.
75. See American Assoc. Med. Colleges v. Carey, 728 F. Supp. 873, 880 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (rev’d
sub nom. American Assoc. Med. Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519 (2nd Cir. 1991)); Ultra-Precision
Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Carson Optical, Inc. v. Prym
Consumer USA, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 317, 331 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Table I, infra.
76. See Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2005); American
Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 534, 539 (D.D.C. 2015);
American Educational Research Association, Inc. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 542, 547
(D.D.C. 2015); infra Table I.
77. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984).
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IV. OPINIONS WITH A LACK OF RATIONALE AND CAUTION
Lower court opinions citing the “historic kinship” without following
Sony’s rationale or caution cover a vast range of legal issues to which the
logic of Sony may not apply. The following topics, addressed by courts
identified in Table I, below, have no logical connection to the vicarious
liability issues in patent and copyright law that the Supreme Court concluded
deserved similar treatment:
Justification for award of attorney’s fee;
Preemption;
Requirement of an “actual controversy”;
Extraterritoriality;
Suit against U.S. by employee;
Patent and copyright misuse;
Contract interpretation;
Accrual of action;
Assignee’s right to sue;
Right to jury;
Waiver of sovereign immunity;
Validity of release;
Copyright registration;
Remedies;
Materiality standard for inequitable conduct;
Use of agency theory in direct infringement;
Standing in declaratory judgment action;
Copyrights subject to execution;
Predicate act doctrine; and
Compulsory counterclaims.
Many involve procedural issues (such as the right to a jury trial, standing,
and whether counterclaims are compulsory) that are entirely different from
the substantive issue involved in Sony. This list invites further analysis of
whether each extension is consistent with the rationale for and doctrinal
structure of patent and copyright law that is beyond the scope of this article.
The forgoing discussion is not meant to suggest that the courts came to
the wrong results or otherwise misused authority when deciding these issues.
This article focuses only on the impropriety of referring to the “historic
kinship” to transfer a rule from one legal regime to another without proper
analysis of whether it is proper to do so. All of these areas are, presumably,
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open for research to consider whether the similar treatment of patent and
copyright and, apparently, trademark78 issues is appropriate.
Quite frequently, a bare reference to the “historic kinship” in a footnote
is all the analysis lower courts employ. For example, John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. DRK Photo,79 involved a copyright question quite divorced from the
substantive question of what facts would create a foundation for vicarious
liability as in Sony. The legal issue was the copyright standard for standing
in the declaratory judgment context.80 The court merely stated that “The
Court’s reliance on cases concerning patent law is entirely appropriate
here.”81 The court then cited Sony and another case summarized on Table I,
Davis v. Blige,82 which involved an entirely different legal issue (licensing).
There was no analysis of the applicability of the rational derived from the
historic kinship or of whether copyright and patent law should be treated
similarly in this respect. In such cases, the bare reference is no support at all
for applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other.
A bare citation to the “historic kinship” does not mean that the opinion
is lacking other support for its ultimate ruling. In this respect, the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
and Co.83 is another typical reference to the “historic kinship.” It contains
considerable analysis of whether its adoption of a “but for” materiality
standard for patent applicant misconduct is desirable.84 But it cites Sony and
refers to the “historic kinship”85 without considering whether its adoption
furthers the rationale for protecting intellectual property generally. While its

78. See the issue of fraud in trademark applications discussed in Sovereign Military Hospitaller
Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. Florida Priory of Knights Hospitallers of
Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, Ecumenical Order, 702 F.3d 1279, 1291–
92 (11th Cir. 2012). The court rejected an analogy between fraud in patent and trademark applications:
It was error to look to this case for the applicable standard to analyze a claim for fraud on the PTO. We have been
admonished to exercise caution before importing standards from one area of intellectual-property law into
another. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984). The Florida Priory
has not pointed to any authority to establish the sort of “historic kinship” that may justify translation of a patentinfringement standard into the mark-application context. Id. at 439; see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (noting “little or no analogy” between trademark rights and those of patent
or copyright); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (“Property in the use of a trade-mark . . . bears very
little analogy to that which exists in copyrights or in patents for new inventions or discoveries....”).

Id.: See also footnote 9, supra, (quoting the Supreme Court’s view of the similarity between patent and
copyright on one hand and trademark on the other).
79. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, 998 F. Supp. 2d 262, 291 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
80. Id. at 291 n.23.
81. Id.
82. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2007).
83. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
84. Id. at 1291–94.
85. Id. at 1295.
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discusses comparable rules in copyright and trademark law,86 the court does
not consider whether there are differences in patent and copyright (or
trademark) law that suggest different treatment. Citing to Sony in this way is
merely a “makeweight” that carries no weight. Again, this is not to suggest
that the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the copyright/trademark rule is
inappropriate. It only suggests that the bare citation to the “historic kinship”
in Sony in this context lacks needed analysis. The lack is highlighted by the
inclusion of the analogy of trademark law in the comparison after the Sony
Court denied that trademark law was analogous.
Overall, the lack of analysis by lower courts is astounding. Since Sony
was decided, only a few intellectual property licensing cases and one
antitrust case considered whether the rationale underlying the adoption of a
patent rule in a copyright case applies when referring to the “historic
kinship.” Only seven cases consider whether the structures of patent and
copyright law are similar enough to justify applying doctrine formulated in
one area to the other.
V. CONCLUSION
The underlying premise of this review is, presumably, uncontroversial.
When citing a higher court for a proposition and applying it in a new context,
a lower court must determine whether the higher court’s original rational
applies. When the higher court warns lower courts to use caution when
applying the proposition in a new context, the lower court must heed that
caution. Lower courts risk adopting arbitrary and/or random rules by failing
to consider the rationale and use caution. The bare citation of a higher court’s
proposition out of context provides no support for a lower court’s conclusion
or, for that matter, a lawyer’s assertion. Applying a higher court’s ruling to
a new factual context requires consideration of whether that precedent fits
the new circumstances.
In Sony, the Supreme Court provided a rationale for apply a patent rule
to copyright law and accompanied it with a caution. The rationale was that
both patent and copyright law are based on the premise that the primary
object of exclusive patent and copyrights is providing the public with the
benefits of innovation and original expressive works. To achieve these
benefits, intellectual property law awards exclusive rights to inventors and
authors. When considering the adoption of a new rule or interpretation,
courts should, therefore, consider the balance between incentives to create
86. Id. at 1295 (observing that “but-for proof is required to invalidate both copyrights and
trademarks based on applicant misconduct.”).
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and society’s interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce.
Caution must be used, however, to ensure that patent and copyright law are
similar enough in their structure and design that treating them the same way
is appropriate. The cases cited by the Supreme Court illustrate the balancing
process and ways in which the differences between copyright and patent law
require different treatment or the similarities permit the transfer of rules from
one regime to the other.
Thirty-seven cases have cited the historic kinship between copyright
and patent law as support for their interpretation of the law. Table I reveals
that only two cases, Harris v. Emus Records Corp.87 and In re Independent
Service Antitrust Litigation88 both apply the Supreme Court’s rationale and
consider the Supreme Court’s caution. Two groups of opinions should also
be excluded from the list of those opinions that have abused the Supreme
Court’s precedent by failing to consider the rationale and use caution when
applying the Sony rule. In the first, the lower court is consider the same issue
of vicarious liability and substantial non-infringing use the Court was
addressing in Sony. If the context does not change in any relevant way, citing
the precedent without repeating the analysis is not problematic. Of the thirtyseven cases, three opinions were related to vicarious liability or substantial
non-infringing use. These are the vicarious liability cases discussed in Part
III, infra.
In the second group, the lower court cites the “historic kinship” when
facing a legal issue in a context already addressed by an authoritative
(higher) court cited by the lower court. Being as generous as possible,
perhaps nine cases involving the issue of intellectual property licensing, fall
into this category. These are the licensing cases discussed in Part III, infra.
In these opinion, a citation to the controlling authority would be sufficient
support for applying the rule that higher court borrowed from another
regime. There would be no independent need for the lower court to cite Sony,
as each of these opinions does.
The vast majority of the cases citing the “historic kinship” fail to do so
properly. Removing the two cases with adequate analysis, the three cases
properly relying on Sony in the vicarious liability context, and the eight
licensing cases relying, however adequately, on precedent, leaves almost
two-thirds of the cases (twenty-four of thirty-seven) abusing the Supreme
Court precedent. This analytical failure may lead to new rules in patent and
copyright law that are not determined by reason or principle.

87. See Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1984) in Table I, infra.
88. In re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131 (D. Kan. 1997).
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TABLE I: Cases Citing “Historic Kinship”89
Case, reference
to “historic
kinship”

Cited
Rationale90

Applied

Cited

Applied

Legal

Rationale

Caution

Caution

Issue

Harris91

Yes92

Yes93

No

Yes94

Transferability
of license

Casella95

No

No

Yes96

No97

Justification for
attorney’s fees

A.A.M.C.98

No

No99

No

No

Copyright
preemption of
state law

SQL
Solutions100

No

No101

No

No

Transferability
of license

Atari102

No103

No104

No

No

Existence of
actual
controversy

Subafilms105

No

No

No

No

Extraterritorial
application of
copyright laws

Twin Books106

No

No

No

No

Licensee
estoppel

Matthew
Bender107

No

No

No

No108

Justiciability
requirement for
declaratory
judgment

Herbert109

No

No

No

No

No suit against
U.S. by
author/employee

Patient110

Yes111

No112

No

No

Transferability
of license

Ind. Service
Organizations113

Yes114

Yes115

No

Yes116

Patent and
copyright
misuse

RT Computer117

Yes118

No

No

No119

Licensing
contract
interpretation

Gardner120

No

Yes121

No

No

Transferability
of license
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Buildnet122

No123

No

No

No

Transferability
of license

Wechsberg124

No

No

Yes125

No126

Accrual of
action

Dynacore127

No

No128

No

No

Vicarious
liability

Silvers129

Majority:
No

Majority:
No

Majority:
No

Majority:
Yes133

Dissent
(Berzon):

Dissent
(Berzon):

Yes130
(Bea): No
Dissent

Yes131
Dissent
(Bea):
No

Dissent
(Berzon):
No
Dissent
(Bea):
Yes132

Dissent
(Berzon):
Yes134
Dissent
(Bea):
Yes135

Standing:
Assignee’s right
to sue.

Taylor136

Yes

No

No

No

Clearly
erroneous
standard and
right to jury

Monotype
Imaging137

No

No

No

No

Infringement

UltraPrecision138

No

No

No

No

Preemption

Cincom
Systems [I]139

No

No

No

No

Transferability
of license

Blueport140

No

No

No

Yes141

Jurisdiction:
waiver of
sovereign
immunity

Davis142

No

No

No

Yes143

Validity of
release

Walton144

No

No

Yes145

No

Jurisdiction:
copyright
Registration

Goldman146

No

No

Yes147

Yes148

Remedies

Cincom
Systems [II]149

No

No

No

No

Transferability
of license

Therasense150

No

No

No

No

Materiality
standard for
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inequitable
conduct
Akamai151

No

No

No

No

Agency theory
in direct
infringement?

Sovereign 152

No

No

Yes153

Yes154

Fraud in
trademark
application155

John Wiley156

No

No

No

No

Standing:
declaratory
judgments

Carson
Optical157

No

No

No

No

Preemption by
patent law?

Hendricks158

No

No

No

No

Copyrights
subject to
execution?

Promega159

No

No

No

No

Defining
inducement

A.S.T.M.160

No

No

No

No

Right to jury?

A.E.R.A.161

No

No

No

No

Right to jury?

WesternGeco162

No

No

No

No

Predicate act
doctrine

Touchpoint163

No

No

No

No

Counterclaims
compulsory?

89. This table describes every case in the Westlaw federal cases database that contains the phrase
“historic kinship.” All cite Sony and all are intellectual property cases except for two antitrust cases
involving either patents or copyrights. The Table summarizes each lower court’s analysis. The entry in
each cell inevitably reflects the author’s judgment. For instance, while the rationale for intellectual
property protection calls for a balance of incentives and access calls for consideration of both the reasons
for providing incentives for creators and access to the public, some courts focus only on providing
incentives. The table would record these courts as not having applied the rationale. Similarly, when the
court does not quote Sony’s admonition to use caution when equating the two areas, courts occasionally
compare the laws in the two areas to determine whether they are similar enough to support equal
treatment. For these occasions, the table records that the caution was not cited but it was applied. See,
e.g., footnote 94. Also, courts occasionally relied on precedent in cases involving the same legal issue or
a comparison of patent and copyright policy as a basis for applying the rule of one regime to another. In
such cases, the table reflects no citing to the caution but an application of the caution. See, e.g., footnote
141. When a court cites precedent for applying one regime’s rules to another regime but the precedent
involve a different legal issue, the table records no application of the caution. See, e.g. footnote 158.
90. The summary entered in each cell indicates whether the court discussed the rationale in the
context of the legal issue for which the “historic kinship” was cited. As the following footnotes indicate,
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courts occasionally considered the rationale in the context of other legal issues present in the case, such
as copyright fair use. See, e.g., footnotes 108, 112, and 113.
91. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1333.
92. Id. at 1334.
93. Id. at 1334 (stating:
Such an interpretation of a license accords with the policies underlying enactment of the Copyright Act. The
legislative history reveals an acute awareness of the need to delicately balance competing interests. On the one
hand, there was a strong reluctance to allow a monopolization of works or compositions; at the same time, there
was an awareness of the necessity of preserving the rights of authors and composers in order to stimulate
creativity. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). Illustrative of the compromises adopted is the
compulsory licensing provision which permitted the copyright holder to control first use while providing a
mechanism for others to obtain licenses once first use had been authorized. The notice provision for compulsory
licenses insures that the copyright owner can monitor use in order to determine that accountings are accurate. The
same consideration is relevant here. By licensing rather than assigning his interest in the copyright, the owner
reserves certain rights, including that of collecting royalties. His ability to monitor use would be jeopardized by
allowing sublicensing without notice. In fact precisely such a scenario underlies this litigation).

94. The court stated “A patent license has been characterized as “a naked license to make and sell
the patented improvement as a part of its business, which right, if it existed, was a mere personal one, and
not transferable, and was extinguished with the dissolution of the corporation.” citing Hapgood v.
Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886) and other cases. Harris, at 1333. The court further stated:
Such an interpretation of a license accords with the policies underlying enactment of the Copyright Act. The
legislative history reveals an acute awareness of the need to delicately balance competing interests. On the one
hand, there was a strong reluctance to allow a monopolization of works or compositions; at the same time, there
was an awareness of the necessity of preserving the rights of authors and composers in order to stimulate creativity.
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).

Id. at 1334. The court then described how the licensing provisions of the Copyright Act were illustrative
of this compromise. Id. at 1334. The court did not quote the cautionary language. Its comparison of patent
and copyright law and principles in the language quoted constitute its analysis of the rationale and caution.
95. Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 367 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987).
96. Id. at 367 n. 6.
97. While the court was persuaded by the reasoning of a patent case in this copyright case, it did not
explain why it adopted the patent rule despite acknowledging the differences. See Casella, 820 F.2d at
367 n.6 (noting that “Both patent law and copyright law allow awards of attorney’s fees. The standards,
however, are different: patent law authorizes fee awards in ‘exceptional cases. [Citing 35 U.S.C. § 285.]
Copyright law has no corresponding threshold: ‘The court in its discretion may allow....’ [Citing 17
U.S.C. § 505.]”
98. American Assoc. Med. Colleges v. Carey, 728 F. Supp. 873, 880 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
99. The court cited neither the rationale nor the caution in the preemption context, though it did
discuss the rationale as applied to a separate copyright fair use issue. A.A.M.C., 728 F. Supp. at 882 (“The
tension between the Copyright Act’s dual goals of greater access to information and its provision for
exclusivity of ownership rights makes the question of fair use “‘the most troublesome in the whole law
of copyright.’” citing Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Dellar
v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2nd Cir.1939)).
100. SQL Solutions Inc. v. Oracle Corp., Not Reported in F. Supp., 1991 WL 626458, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. 1991).
101. The court did not reconsider the rationale and did not apply the caution, but cited Harris v. Emus
Records Corp., 734 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1984), which considered both in a case involving the same legal
issue. SQL Solutions, 1991 WL 626458 at *6 (“The Emus Records court observed that a parallel
prohibition against the transfer of copyright licenses gave effect to the policy of protecting creativity
underlying enactment of the Copyright Act.”). Note that this quotation only refers to one half of the policy
balancing—protecting copyright owners.
102. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 841 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
103. Id. at 842. The court does not apply the rationale for treating patent and copyright similarly
when considering the existence of an actual controversy (for which the “historic kinship” was cited), but
does cite and apply the rationale when considering the applicability of the copyright fair use doctrine. Id.
at 842–43.
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104. Again, the court does not apply the rationale for treating patent and copyright similarly when
considering the existence of an actual controversy (for which the “historic kinship” was cited), but does
cite and apply the rationale when considering the applicability of the copyright fair use doctrine. Id. at
842–43.
105. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1092 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994).
106. Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 877 F. Supp. 496, 500 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
107. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., Not Reported in F. Supp., 1996 WL 223917, at
*1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
108. The court does not apply the caution as illustrated in Sony but cites precedent for applying a
patent rule in the copyright justiciability context, Id. at *1 n.1 (citing Re-Alco v. National Center for
Health Education, 812 F. Supp. 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying patent standards articulated in
Wembley v. Superba Cravats, 315 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1963) to copyright case)).
109. Herbert v. U.S., 36 Fed. Cl. 299, 305 n.4 (Ct. Fed. Claims 1996).
110. In re Patient Educ. Media, 210 B.R. 237, 241 n.7 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct. 1997).
111. Id. at 240.
112. The court cites the rationale, but in its policy analysis only mentions the policy supporting
exclusive rights. Id. at 242 (stating “The federal policy designed to protect the limited monopoly of
copyright owners and restrict unauthorized use constitutes applicable nonbankruptcy law” and observing
that “the fundamental policy of the federal patent system is to encourage the creation and disclosure of
new advances in technology.”)
113. In re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D. Kan. 1997).
114. Id. at 1142.
115. The court in Ind. Serv. Organizations, at 1143, cites two cases, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.1990) and Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970
(4th Cir. 1990). These cases cited additional cases involving copyright misuse that had previously
identified the underlying policies of both regimes as being consistent with treating both the same. See,
e.g., Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976 (“[S]ince copyright and patent law serve parallel public interests, a
“misuse” defense should apply to infringement actions brought to vindicate either right.”).
116. Indep. Serv. Organizations, at 1133–34.
117. RT Computer Graphics Inc. v. U.S., 44 Fed. Cl. 747, 758 n.10 (U.S. Ct. Claims 1997).
118. Id. at 752.
119. R.T. Computer is a case based on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (b), which gives copyright owners the
right to sue the government for infringement. While the court neither cited the caution nor analyzed in
detail whether it was appropriate to extend patent law rules to copyright rules, it did quote Boyle v. United
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 60 (Fed.Cl.1999) (“Section 1498(b) was created when Congress ‘extended’ the
provisions of section 1498(a) [relating to patent infringement] to permit an action in [the Court of Federal
Claims] for copyright infringements.”). This reference suggests that it is appropriate to adopt similar rules
for patent and copyright law.
120. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002).
121. Id. (quoting Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 132, 134 (9th Cir. 1984)).
122. In re Buildnet, Inc., Not Reported in B.R., 2002 WL 31103235, at *5 n.3 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct.
2002).
123. The court in Buildnet, at *5, referred to only half of the balancing of incentives and access,
stating “The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. is intended to grant the copyright owner a limited
monopoly which provides the owner a period of time during which to reap the benefits of his work.”
124. Wechsberg v. U.S., 54 Fed. Cl. 158, 162 (U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims 2002).
125. Id. at 162.
126. Addressing the cautionary language, the court noted that the defendant’s interpretation of
copyright law would unfairly result in different treatment of copyright and patent owners who were in
the same position and, for that reason, rejected the defendant’s argument and applied the patent rule in
the copyright context. Id. at 163.
127. Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
128. The court in Dynacore applies the reasoning in Sony related to the substantial non-infringing
use rule to the patent context from which it was originally derived, making this unadorned use of the
reference to the “historic kinship” appropriate. See the discussion in id. at 1275.
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129. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment Corp., 402 F.3d 881, 887, 905, (Graber, C.J.), 905 (Bea,
J. dissenting) (9th Cir. 2005).
130. Id. (Berzon J., dissenting), at 893.
131. Id. (Berzon J., dissenting), at 893–94 (quoting the rationale and stating that “I see nothing in the
assignment of accrued claims of Frank & Bob Films for infringement of a work created by
Silvers to Silvers that violates these background principles. . . . Silvers, as the creator, is the person for
whom the copyright system is designed to provide incentives for more creations.”)
132. Id. (Bea, J. dissenting), at 905.
133. Id. at 888. The majority did not quote the Sony caution but stated:
Despite the differences between patents and copyrights, and between the statutes governing them, the common
question is whether a substantive, exclusive right to intellectual property may be divorced from a cause of action
for infringement of that substantive right. Under both copyright and patent law, substantive rights are assignable;
the question whether those rights are severable from the entitlement to sue someone for infringing those rights
requires a similar analysis.

Id.
134. Id. (Berzon, J. dissenting), at 894:
In general, “patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange.” ”The disclosure required by the Patent Act
is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’” ”For the author seeking copyright protection, in contrast, disclosure
is the desired objective, not something exacted from the author in exchange for the copyright.” [Citations omitted.]

135. Id. (Bea, J. dissenting), at 905.
136. Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2005).
137. Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2005 WL 936882, at
*6 n. 5 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
138. Ultra-Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
139. Cincom Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp., Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2007 WL 128999, at *2
n.5 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
140. Blueport Co., LLP v. U.S., 76 Fed. Cl. 702, 713 (U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims 2007).
141. While not citing Sony’s cautionary language, the court cited statutory language justifying similar
treatment of patent and copyright cases. Id. at 713–14.
142. Davis v. Blige, 505 F. 3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2007).
143. Though the court did not cite to the cautionary language of Sony, the court briefly noted that
“[l]icenses in patent and copyright function similarly, see Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329,
1333 (9th Cir.1984), and thus it is appropriate to consider copyright licensing, like patent licensing,
prospective in nature.” Id.
144. Walton v. U.S., 80 Fed. Cl. 251, 264 n.19 (U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims 2008).
145. Id. at 264 n.19.
146. Goldman v. Healthcare Management Systems, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 853, 875 (W.D. Mich.
2008).
147. Id. at 875.
148. Id. at 875–76:
Copyright protects the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. While copyright protects the original
expression of the idea, patents protect the innovative idea. Copyright protection does not extend to any “idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which
it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a work.” Patents encourage technological development
by preventing others from making, using or selling an invention for a specified amount of time. Copyright
protection is much narrower, protecting only an exclusive right to reproduce an original expression.
The ability to achieve the same or similar result using an alternative means may implicate the novelty
of an idea and hence is relevant to the final assessment of damages in a patent suit, the same cannot be said in a
copyright suit. Patents encourage innovation. Copyrights encourage originality in expression. Copyrights give the
holder the exclusive right to reproduce an original or derivative work. If the work is infringed by copying without
authorization, the copyright holder is entitled to damages for that infringement. The ability to avoid damages by
rewriting a computer program, or a song, or reproducing a painting, should not be considered because it would not
implicate the originality of the expression being protected. Those concerns are considered in patent cases precisely
because the alternatives question the novelty of the patent; if there are alternatives, or could be alternatives in the
marketplace, the idea is not novel.

149. Cincom Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 435 n.2 (6th Cir. 2009).
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150. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
151. Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
152. Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v.
Florida Priory of Knights Hospitallers of Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta,
Ecumenical Order, 702 F.3d 1279, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (vacating and superseding an earlier opinion in
the same case reported at 694 F.3d 1200 without any effect on the content of the analysis).
153. Id. at 1291 (stating “The Florida Priory has not pointed to any authority to establish the sort of
“historic kinship” that may justify translation of a patent-infringement standard into the mark-application
context.”
154. Id.
155. The defendant attempted to apply a patent law standard for fraud on the PTO during the
application process in a trademark case. The court rejected this attempted based on the Sony Court’s
denial of any historic kinship between patent and trademark law. Id. at 1192 (citing Sony Corp. of
America v. University City Studios, Inc., 464, U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984); United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (noting “little or no analogy” between trademark rights and those
of patent or copyright); and McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (stating “Property in the use of
a trade-mark . . . bears very little analogy to that which exists in copyrights or in patents for new
inventions or discoveries. . . .”)).
156. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, 998 F. Supp. 2d 262, 291 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
157. Carson Optical, Inc. v. Prym Consumer USA, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 317, 331 n.5 (E.D.N.Y.
2014).
158. Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. Clinton, 766 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2014).
159. Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1358 n.2 (Prost, C.J., dissenting)
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
160. American Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 534,
539 (D.D.C. 2015). The opinion in this case is almost identical to the opinion in A.E.R.A., footnote 170,
infra, which involved the same court, defendant, and issue. The cases were decided the same day. The
only differences are the names of the plaintiffs.
161. American Educational Research Association, Inc. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d
542, 547 (D.D.C. 2015).
162. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 621 Fed. Appx. 663, 664 (Wallach, C.J.
dissenting) (Fed. Cir. 2015).
163. Touchpoint Communications, LLC v. Dentalfone, LLC, Slip Copy 2016 WL 524260, at *4
(W.D. Wash. February 10, 2016).

